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Abstract—Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of
providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work
based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of
cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing
cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure
provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider,
e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The
blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the
security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the
cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium
according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model
the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the
blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their
demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical
results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.
Index Terms—Blockchain service, mining, attack, double-spending, cyber-insurance, game theory.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN the past few years, blockchain technologies have at-tracted tremendous attention from both industry and
academia for distributively providing the irreversible,
tamper-evident database of tokenized asset transactions [1].
Furthermore, with the smart contracts [2] enabled on top
of the decentralized consensus [1], blockchains are envis-
aged to be the “game changer” in various areas ranging
from Peer-to-Peer (P2P) resource allocation/trading, e.g.,
distributed cloud storage [3], to financial services, e.g., dig-
ital identity management [4] and online markets for crowd-
sourcing services [5]. Although with the advantages such as
open access, disintermediation, and pure self-organization,
open-access/permissionless blockchains rely on the condi-
tion of honest majority to guarantee the data integrity and
service security, especially when the Nakamoto consensus
protocol based on proof-of-work (PoW) is adopted [1]. Since
permissionless blockchain networks admit no identity con-
trol, they can be vulnerable to a series of insider attacks
by malicious consensus nodes [6]. Among different types
of attacks, double spending [7] is the most fundamental
one and can be executed through various attacks such
as goldfinger attacks, netsplit attacks and brute-force at-
tacks [6]. In brief, a double-spending attacker attempts to
simultaneously spend the same set of blockchain tokens
in two different transactions. This can be performed by
first persuading part of the network and the transaction
receiver to confirm one transaction, and then persuading the
majority of the network to override that transaction with a
conflicting transaction spending the same set of tokens. In
other words, double-spending attacks are executed through
intentional blockchain forking. Due to the factors such as
randomness in solving the PoW puzzles [1] and information
propagation delay, the malicious nodes, i.e., attackers, only
need to hold a certain level of PoW computing power to
succeed with a high probability in the double-spending
attacks. Note here that although the double-spending attack
is initially devised for Bitcoin, the attack is also applicable
to other blockchain-based resource trading services and sys-
tems, for example, energy trading [8], plug-in hybrid electric
vehicle (PHEV) charging credit management [9], wireless
spectrum trading [10], bandwidth exchange in community
networks [11] and cache storage trading [12].
Although a few approaches, e.g., [13], have been intro-
duced in blockchains to deter and prevent attacks, due to the
inherent characteristics of openness, the PoW-based permis-
sionless blockchain networks may not be completely secure.
This critically hinders the broader adoption of permission-
less blockchains, especially in business services that require
high-level service security. Along with the studies on the
improvement of blockchain protocols, blockchain service
providers are also looking for an alternative means of cyber-
risk management. Recently, cyber-insurance has been rec-
ognized as a promising approach to efficiently manage the
cyber risks by transferring them to insurers [14]. Similar to
the traditional insurance, the customer of a cyber-insurance
product, i.e., a policyholder, is insured once it settles the con-
tract with the insurer by paying a premium. If attacks hap-
pen and the damage is within the coverage of the insurance
policy, the insurer will pay the claim to the customer accord-
ingly. To date, a number of cyber-insurance products have
been made available in the market [15]. According to the
types of target systems, these products can be categorized
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Figure 1: An overview of the blockchain service market.
into specific groups designed for service providers such as
ISPs and clouds, single mobile/work stations, networks of
devices and dedicated cyber-physical/industrial systems.
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach of jointly
providing the risk management and security enhance-
ment to the blockchain users and providers against attacks
through the means of the cyber-insurance. As in other insur-
able cyber-systems, the market design of cyber-insurance
for blockchain networks also has to address a few impor-
tant issues. Firstly, from the cyber-insurer’s perspective, the
scope and policy of the cyber-insurance have to be clearly
defined in regard to what kind of attacks to be covered and
how to quantify the risk, the possible damage and thus
the insurance premium. Secondly, alongside the reactive
risk transfer with the cyber-insurance, rational blockchain
providers also have to consider the proactive strategy in
security improvement and thus balance the investment in
the infrastructure and in the cyber-insurance.
To answer these questions, we consider a PoW-based
blockchain service market under the threat of double-
spending attacks (see Fig. 1). The market is composed of
three entities, namely, the users, the blockchain provider,
and the cyber-insurer. The users subscribe to a service,
e.g., P2P energy trading for smart grids, which is imple-
mented on top of the blockchain provided by the blockchain
provider. We consider that the blockchain provider is com-
posed of a group of individual honest machines which
are responsible for maintaining the data consensus in the
framework of PoW-based permissionless blockchains. The
blockchain provider purchases the computing resource from
cloud-based infrastructure providers1 or deploys more com-
puting power internally for maintaining the network con-
sensus. Meanwhile, in order to lower the cost on infrastruc-
ture, third-party devices are encouraged to join the decen-
tralized consensus process by dedicating their individual
computing resources into the network. Working as a sin-
gle blockchain provider, the group of consensus machines
make profit by charging the users with the transaction
1. For example, Amazon AWS provides the blockchain infrastruc-
tures through its partner ecosystem [16].
processing fees and block mining fees [1]. To neutralize
the economic/financial loss incurred by double-spending
attacks, the blockchain provider purchases the insurance
from the cyber-insurer, which adopts an adjustable premium
pricing strategy according to its perceived risk level of the
blockchain.
We propose a two-stage Stackelberg game model to an-
alyze the dynamics of the considered market. On the upper
stage of the game, the blockchain provider and the cyber-
insurer lead to adopt their best-response strategies for profit
maximization. On the lower stage, the users adjust their
service demands according to the cost and the security level
of the blockchain. More specifically, the major contributions
of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We formulate the mechanisms of blockchain service
pricing, blockchain infrastructure investment and
cyber-insurance premium adjustment as a joint mar-
ket equilibrium problem. We model the interactions
among the three parties in the market as a two-
level Stackelberg game. We provide and prove a
few important theoretical discoveries regarding the
properties of the equilibrium in the market game.
2) We incorporate the social externality [17], [18]
among blockchain users in our end-user utility
model. Also, by modeling the impact of comput-
ing power on the blockchain security, we consider
the blockchain provider’s strategy to incorporate
both dimensions of infrastructure investment and
insurance spendings. Furthermore, by adopting the
concept of “risk-adjusted premium”, we mathemati-
cally capture the impact of attack probability on pre-
mium pricing from the cyber-insurer’s perspective.
3) We conduct extensive evaluation to assess the per-
formance of the three parties with their equilib-
rium strategies at different levels of the attacker-
controlled computing power.
The proposed market framework introduces a novel
incentive-compatible business ecosystem, where the
blockchain service users benefit from enjoying more resilient
services, and both the blockchain provider and the cyber-
insurer are able to gain more profits. In fact, the potential
of cyber-insurance for blockchain, Bitcoin specifically, has
been perceived in the market. For example, Petra Insurance
Brokers (www.insurewithpetra.com) introduces the concept
of insurance for Bitcoin transactions. Likewise, BitCoin
Financial Group unveils “BitSecure”, which is a Bitcoin
theft insurance policy (www.bitcoinfinancialgroup.com).
This product covers both external hacking and employee
theft. Moreover, more insurance products are emerging in
which a few of them focus on general blockchain services.
Therefore, our proposed concept and framework of cyber
insurance for blockchain services has a clear and direct
practical implication. Moreover, from the perspective of
market design, the blockchain services are typically highly
customized for a certain environment and application. Thus,
we consider the mutual trading between single insurer and
single provider. The model of a many-to-many market for
multiple insurers and providers is likely to be intractable
and needs further development, and hence it is beyond
the scope of this paper. Finally, the model developed in
3this paper can be readily extended to blockchains with the
emerging consensus protocols based on the generalized
proof of concepts [1], where investment in other resources,
e.g., stakes, is needed to prevent attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related work. Section 3 describes the prelim-
inaries about blockchains and cyber-insurance, the system
model, and the formulation of Stackelberg game. Section 4
investigates the existence and uniqueness of the equilib-
rium in the proposed Stackelberg game under practical
assumptions. Section 5 presents the numerical performance
evaluation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
The permissionless blockchain network was originally con-
ceptualized in the famous grassroot cryptocurrency project
“Bitcoin” as a decentralized database for tamper-proof
recording and trusted timestamping for the transactional
data between P2P users. Permissionless blockchains have
been widely recognized for the superb consensus scalability,
the tamper-evidence data organization and the capability
of supporting the distributed, general-purpose virtual ma-
chines [1], [19]. For this reason, in recent years there has seen
a plethora of emerging application based on blockchains
such as Internet finance and property digitization [20], self-
organization for Internet of Things [21] and other non-
financial applications, e.g., notary documents and anti-
counterfeit solutions [22].
Permissionless blockchain networks creatively solve the
problems of replicated consensus in open-access networks
by introducing the financial incentive and cryptical zero-
knowledge proof into the consensus process [1]. More
specifically, any node in the blockchain network is allowed
to issue digitally signed transactions to other nodes by
“broadcasting” the transactions in a gossip manner over
the P2P links between the nodes. The consensus nodes
pack up an arbitrary subset of unapproved transactions
into a cryptographically protected data structure, i.e., the
“block”, and rival with each other in a block publishing
race (also known as block mining) to acquire the block
mining reward [23]. Following the Nakamoto protocol for
blockchain state maintenance [1], the consensus nodes only
accept the longest chain among all the locally observable
candidates of the blockchain state as their canonical view of
the blockchain. To determine the winner of a block mining
race, the consensus nodes have to perform an exhaustive
search for the solutions of the crypto-puzzles built upon
their proposed blocks. In other words, the nodes that acquire
more computing power will have higher probability of
winning the race and hence the more power of controlling
the blockchain state [1]. Therefore, the honest consensus
nodes have to secure a sufficiently large amount of com-
puting power to guarantee the well-being of the blockchain
services, e.g., data integrity [23]. Grabbing more computing
power, on the other hand, is also from which the malicious
nodes start to breach the blockchain networks.
Cyber-insurance, in the meanwhile, has been recognized
as an innovative tool to manage the cyber risks and alleviate
the damage of cyber-attacks for the insured customers [24].
Cyber-insurance provides the coverage on losses and lia-
bilities from network/information security breaches. This
greatly incentivizes the security investments by cyber-
physical systems. However, compared with classical insur-
ance, cyber-insurance introduces a number of unique issues.
For example, due to the interdependence of security systems
or lack of statistical data, it is difficult to assess the systems’
vulnerability and hence hard to estimate the risk trans-
ferred to the cyber-insurer [15]. For the transaction-oriented
cyber services built upon permissionless blokchains, the
designer of cyber-insurance also faces the similar issues.
Nevertheless, recent studies on the mechanisms of double-
spending attacks [25], [26], [27] have shed light upon the
possible approaches in analytically assessing the risks of this
fundamental threat on the blockchain systems. For example,
in [25], the authors proposed a new protocol which requires
the consensus nodes, i.e., block miners, to confirm transac-
tions only if the inputs of the transactions have not been
spent, hence preventing users from double-spending their
funds. Based on the characteristics of intentional forking
in double-spending attacks, the authors in [26], [27] intro-
duced the methods to estimate the probability of successful
double-spending attacks by analyzing the investments in
computing resource of both the blockchain maintainers and
attackers. With these studies, it is now possible to estimate
the probability of successful double spending and evaluate
the potential risks transferred to the cyber-insurers.
Furthermore, under the condition that the probability
distribution of risk can be estimated, the authors in [28]
proposed a risk-adjusted premium for pricing risks based
on the Proportional Hazard (PH) transform, namely, a
power transform in the decumulative distribution function
of the risks. Since the PH transform satisfies the elementary
principles of assigning premiums, i.e., scale-invariance and
translation-invariance, it has been adopted in a number of
works concerning the premium determination. In addition,
a class of premium functions which are comonotonicity ad-
ditive and stochastic dominance preservative were studied
in [29]. Therein, the premium determination method based
on the PH transform was generalized with an axiomatic
approach, and the principles such as the absolute deviation
principle [30] were thoroughly studied and compared.
However, to the best of our knowledge, it still remains
an open field of research to employ the cyber-insurance for
alleviating the damage of double-spending attack for the
blockchain providers. The aforementioned works inspire a
vision of quantifying the risk of double-spending attacks
based on the computing resources owned by the blockchain
maintainers and attackers. Then, the corresponding insur-
ance premium can be determined under the framework
based on the PH transform. By transferring the risks caused
by double spending to the cyber-insurers, the cyber-physical
services residing on the blockchains can be much more
robust. This is also the major objective of our studies.
3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND GAME FORMULA-
TION
In this section, we first introduce the model of successful
attack probability for double spending and the concept of
risk-adjusted premium. After formulating the utilities of the
4blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer, we
investigate the problem of users’ service demand, service
pricing and infrastructure, i.e., computing power, invest-
ment by the blockchain provider and premium pricing by
the cyber-insurer jointly as a hierarchical market game.
The cyber-insurance for blockchain-based service un-
der our consideration works as follows. The blockchain
provider firsts pay the premium determined by the cyber-
insurer. If the double-spending attack happens, which is
detected by the provider or users, the provider files the
claims to the cyber-insurer. The cyber-insurer verifies the
claim and makes the payment to the provider to compensate
for the damage of the double spending. The methods to
detect and verify the double spending attack are available
and can be adopted, e.g., by deploying an observer as in [31],
and hence they are not the focus of this paper.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Successful Attack Probability
We consider that the honest consensus nodes work jointly
as a single blockchain provider and are responsible for
maintaining a permissionless, PoW-based blockchain for
service provision. Extending the analysis in [26] and [27], we
assume that during a time period of T , the total computing
resource of the blockchain network measured by the hash
rate is fixed as H . Following the Nakamoto consensus pro-
tocol, every consensus node runs an independent Poisson
process for puzzle-solving. The average time for a new
block to be mined in the blockchain network is T0 [1].
Then, in the time period of T , the expected number of
blocks being successfully mined in the network is TT0 . Let
h denote the investment in computing resources by the
blockchain provider, i.e., the honest nodes, and a denote the
investment in computing resources by the attackers. Then,
if the computing efficiency for hash queries are roughly the
same, the blockchain provider and the attackers divide the
total computing resource H as h¯H and a¯H , respectively,
where h¯ = ha+h and a¯ =
a
a+h are the investment ratios.
According to the probabilistic model for winning the PoW-
based puzzle solving race [26], the number of blocks that are
mined by the blockchain provider and waiting for confirma-
tion during T is TT0
h¯H
H =
T
T0
h¯. On the other hand, instead of
following the Poisson distribution based model, the number
of blocks successfully mined by attackers during T can be
accurately modeled as a negative binomial variable [26].
Therefore, with the investment ratio h¯, the probability for
attackers to succeed in double spending during T can be
expressed as follows (see Theorem 1 in [27]):
P
(
h
)
= I4(1−h¯)h¯
(
T
T0
h¯,
1
2
)
, h¯ ≥ 1
2
, (1)
where Iw (u, v) is the regularized incomplete Beta function:
Iw (u, v) =
Γ (u+ v)
Γ (u) Γ (v)
∫ w
0
tu−1(1− t)v−1dt (2)
with Γ (·) being the gamma function. The model of expo-
nential decay in (1) is discovered in [32] and proved in [27].
We consider that the blockchain provider receives pay-
ments from the users in the form of transaction fees in
a confirmed block. Under double-spending attacks, the
blockchain provider has to compensate the loss of the users
with a fixed rate for each transaction in the block that is
finally overridden. Assume that the number of transactions
included in each block is the same, and hence the transaction
fee and compensation rate are fixed for each transaction.
Let NT denote the number of transactions in a block, r
denote the block mining reward for each block and q de-
note the total compensation rate for each block. Then, with
the investment ratio h¯, the blockchain provider’s potential
loss is TT0 h¯NTq under the double-spending attack, and the
probability of successful attack is:
P
(
h¯
)
=

I4(1−h¯)h¯
(
T
T0
h¯,
1
2
)
, h¯ ≥ 1
2
,
1, h¯ <
1
2
.
(3)
Here, we only focus on the case where the investment ratio
of the blockchain provider is no less than 1/2. The reason
is that when h¯ < 1/2, the probability of successful double
spending is always equal to 1 as shown in (3), which is
trivial and thus not our focus.
3.1.2 Premium Determination
The cyber-insurer offers a cyber-insurance service to the
blockchain provider and covers its total loss when the attack
happens. In other words, after the blockchain provider
buys the cyber-insurance, the risk of double-spending at-
tack will be transferred to the cyber-insurer. By adopting
the concept of risk-adjusted premium in [29], the cyber-
insurer dynamically determines the price, i.e., premium,
of its cyber-insurance product according to the insurance
risk distribution. According to our previous discussion, the
cyber-insurer has an insurance risk, i.e., paying the claim of
T
T0
h¯NTq with the probability of P
(
h¯
)
given by (3). Then,
the expected loss for the cyber-insurer can be formulated as
follows:
Eloss =
∫ 1
1/2
T
T0
h¯NTqP
(
h¯
)
dh¯ =
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
h¯P
(
h¯
)
dh¯
=
T
T0
NTq
[
h¯F
(
h¯
)∣∣h¯=1
h¯=1/2
−
∫ 1
1/2
F
(
h¯
)
dh¯
]
≤ T
T0
NTq
[
3
4
−
∫ 1
1/2
F
(
h¯
)
dh¯
]
=
T
T0
NTq
[∫ 1
1/2
3
2
dh¯−
∫ 1
1/2
F
(
h¯
)
dh¯
]
=
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
3
2
− F (h¯) dh¯
=
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ h¯
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dh¯,
(4)
where F
(
h¯
)
is the cumulative distribution function for
P
(
h¯
)
2. Based on the formulated distribution of the insur-
ance risk and the concept of risk-adjusted premium, the
cyber-insurer can determine the premium as follows:
Λ (γ) =
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
ω
(
1−
∫ h¯
1/2
P (θ) dθ, γ
)
dh¯, (5)
where ω (x, γ) is an increasing concave function of x and
belongs to the families of elementary transforms given in
Section 5 of [29]. Without loss of generality, we adopt the
2. Note here that we assume that the cyber-insurer is considering the
worst case.
5PH transform in our study, i.e., ω (x, γ) = x
1
γ , γ ≥ 1 in
Subsection 5.1 of [29]. Then, the corresponding premium
can be expressed as follows:
Λ (γ) =
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ h¯
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
dh¯, (6)
where γ is the premium coefficient which decides on the
insurance policy. Namely, the cyber-insurer adjusts the pre-
mium by controlling γ according to the insurance risk. It
is worth noting that the term
[
1− ∫ h¯1/2 P (θ) dθ] in (6) is
smaller than 1. Therefore, the larger γ is, the higher the
premium Λ (γ) will be.
3.2 System Model
3.2.1 The User’s Utility
We suppose that each user in the blockchain service market
has a service demand, which is determined by an intrinsic
value θi from the uniform distribution FU over the interval
[0, 1]. Here, θi can be interpreted as the probability for user
i to buy the blockchain service. We further assume that the
intrinsic values of the users are independently distributed.
The users also experience social externalities in which the
decision of one user can influence the decisions of the other
users. Let Pr [j buys the service] denote the probability that
user j subscribes to the service, then, the utility of user i can
be expressed as follows [33]:
ui = h¯+ θi − pi + α
∑
j∈N
gijPr [j buys the service]. (7)
In (7), the first term, i.e., h¯, is the investment ratio of the
blockchain provider. h¯ represents the positive effect owning
to the effort of the blockchain provider in preventing the
security breach due to double-spending attacks. According
to (1), the larger h¯ is, the lower the successful probability
of double-spending attacks is, and consequently the less
the users will be affected. The third term, i.e., pi, is the
price of the service for user i3. The forth term of (7),
i.e., α
∑
j∈N
gijPr [j buys the service], represents the positive social
externality among the users. gij is the element of the exter-
nality matrix G [17], [18] and represents the level of the
social externality (influence) that user j has on user i. We
assume that gij 6= 0, ∀i 6= j and gii = 0, ∀i ∈ N 4. Finally,
α is a constant controlling the level of social externality for
the entire network.
3.2.2 Profits of the Blockchain Provider and the Cyber-
insurer
The goals of the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer
are to maximize their individual profits. Based on our
3. Note here that the uniform pricing in which all users are charged
with the same price is a special case of the discriminative pricing
adopted in this paper.
4. Note here that our model can also be used to analyze the scenario
that the users may act independently. For example, if gij = gji = 0,
user j has zero level of the social externality (influence) on user i and
vice versa. Hence, users i and j act independently.
previous discussion, the payoff functions of the blockchain
provider can be expressed as follows:
Πp
(
h¯,p
)
=
∑
i∈N
pixi − ah¯
1− h¯ + h¯
T
T0
NTr
− T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
premium
,
(8)
where the first term
∑
i∈N pixi is the revenue obtained from
the users’ payment for the blockchain service and xi is
the probability that user i buys the service defined in (13).
The second term, i.e., h= ah¯
1−¯h , is the blockchain provider’s
investment in the infrastructure, and we have h= ah¯
1−¯h⇔ h¯=
h
a+h . The third term, i.e., h¯
T
T0
NTr, is the block mining reward
received by the blockchain provider for maintaining the ser-
vice. The last term, i.e., TT0NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1− ∫ t1/2 P (θ) dθ]1/γdt,
is the premium paid by the blockchain provider to the cyber-
insurer, and q is the compensation price for one transaction.
On the other hand, the premium paid by the blockchain
provider is the revenue of the cyber-insurer. Due to the un-
certainty of double-spending attacks, we adopt the expected
claim as the cyber-insurer’s cost. Then, the cyber-insurer’s
payoff function can be expressed as:
ΠI (γ) =
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
premium
− P (h¯) h¯ T
T0
NTq − σ(h¯, γ),
(9)
where the first term is the premium paid by the blockchain
provider. The second term, i.e., P
(
h¯
)
h¯ TT0NTq, is obtained as
the product of the successful attack probability and the total
claim paid to the blockchain provider for covering its loss.
Finally, since the premium increases as the cyber-insurer’s
decision variable γ increases, a rational cyber-insurer will
keep γ as high as possible to maximum its revenue. How-
ever, when the blockchain provider increases its investment
ratio, the successful attack probability will decrease. As a
result, the blockchain provider will have less incentive to
pay an extremely high premium. Therefore, we introduce
the last term in (9) to model the possibly negative impact
on the expected payoff of the cyber-insurer as both the
values of h¯ and γ increase, which is similar to the concept
of the punishment on insurer adopted in [34]. Here, we
define σ
(
h¯, γ
)
= σ1
(
h¯
)
σ2 (γ), where σ1
(
h¯
)
is an increasing
convex function of h¯ with the following properties:
σ1
(
h¯
)

> 0, h¯ >
1
2
,
= 0, h¯ =
1
2
,
< 0, h¯ <
1
2
.
(10)
The conditions in (10) indicates that with h¯ > 12 , the
blockchain provider’s effort in investing the computing
resource effectively reduces the successful attack probability.
Consequently, the probability of the cyber-insurer paying
the claim to the blockchain provider is also reduced. Then,
keeping the highest premium has a negative effect on the
cyber-insurer’s payoff, e.g., by hurting its reputation or
curbing the incentive for the blockchain provider to buy the
6insurance. Under the other two conditions in (10), the lack
of enough investment in infrastructure of the blockchain
provider will induce higher probability of being successfully
attacked, hence leading to a positive effect on the cyber-
insurer’s payoff due to the higher demand of financial pro-
tection. Additionally, σ2 (γ) is an increasing convex function
of γ and σ2 (γ)|γ=1 = 0. As such, when γ = 1, the expected
loss in (4) is equal to the premium in (6), and there is
no negative effect on the cyber-insurer’s reputation. For
tractable analysis, we adopt the following model:
σ
(
h¯, γ
)
= σ1
(
h¯
)
σ2 (γ) =
(
h¯− 1
2
)3
︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ1(h¯)
(γ − 1) γβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2(γ)
, β > 1. (11)
It is worth noting that the cyber-insurer’s payoff function
in (9) may also adopt other models for σ
(
h¯, γ
)
. The selected
model in (11) has no effect on our subsequent analysis.
3.3 Stackelberg Game Formulation
Considering the payoff functions of the market entities
given in (7)-(9), it is natural to model the interactions in the
blockchain service market as a two-stage game. In the first
upper stage, the blockchain provider determines the price
of the blockchain service, namely, the levels of acceptable
transaction fees for each user pi, and its ratio of investment
in computing resources h¯. Meanwhile, the cyber-insurer
decides on the premium coefficient γ by considering the
insurance risk transferred from the blockchain provider. In
the second lower stage, each user determines whether it will
buy the blockchain service or not based on the prices and
the investment ratio set by the blockchain provider. Accord-
ingly, the interactions among the blockchain provider, the
cyber-insurer and the users are formulated as a two-leader-
multi-follower Stackelberg game. Specifically, the mutual
interaction between the blockchain provider and cyber-
insurer forms a noncooperative two-player leader-level sub-
game for achieving the equilibrium of the service price, the
investment ratio, and the cyber-insurance policy. Then, the
interaction among a number of users forms the follower-
level noncooperative subgame for determining the service
demand from the blockchain provider5. The Stackelberg
game can be formally defined as follows.
1) User-level noncooperative subgame: Given the fixed
investment ratio h¯ as well as the price vectors
p =
[
p1, p2, . . . , p|N|
]>, the user-level (follower) non-
cooperative subgame is defined by a four-tuple
Gu = {N ,x,X ,u}, where
• N is the set of active users;
• X =
{[
x1, x2, . . . x|N|
]>∣∣∣xi ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ N}⊂ R|N|
defines the domain of x as an M-polyhedron;
5. The reason that the users are in the same level, i.e., lower-level,
is that they have the same set of information and make decisions
simultaneously. This is different from the blockchain provider that
usually invests in the infrastructure and buys the cyber-insurance first
to improve the security level of its blockchain-based service and then
provides the service to the users. The cyber-insurer sells the cyber-
insurance to the blockchain provider and forms a noncooperative re-
lationship with the blockchain provider. As such, the cyber-insurer and
blockchain provider make their decisions simultaneously and hence
before the users. As a result, the blockchain provider and cyber-insurer
are considered to be the leaders and their problems are defined in the
upper-level.
• x =
[
x1, x2, . . . x|N|
]> is the vector of the users’
decision variables, where xi is the service
demand of user i and x ∈ X ;
• u =
[
u1, u2, . . . , u|N|
]> is the vector of the users’
utilities with the given strategy x, where ∀i ∈
N , and ui is given in (7).
2) Leader-level noncooperative subgame: Assume that the
users’ demand x has been found to be a parametric
equilibrium as a function, i.e., mapping, of the lead-
ers’ strategies. Then, the blockchain provider and
the cyber-insurer form a noncooperative game as a
five-tuple GL =
{[
p>, h¯
]>
,DP, γ,DI,Π
}
, where
•
[
p>, h¯
]>
=
[
p1, p2, . . . , p|N|, h¯
]> is the strategy
vector of the service prices and the investment
ratio set by the blockchain provider with pi >
0, ∀i ∈ N and h¯ ∈ [ 12 , 1);
• DP =
{[
p>, h¯
]>∣∣∣ pu ≥ pi > 0, ∀i ∈ N , h¯ ∈ [ 12 , 1)}
is the domain of the prices and investment
ratio of the blockchain provider, where pu is
the upper bound of the price pi imposed by
the government or market regulators;
• γ is the cyber-insurer’s premium coefficient
for premium determination;
• DI = {γ| γu ≥ γ > 1} defines the domain of γ,
where γu is the upper bound of γ imposed by
the government or regulators;
• Π = [Πp,ΠI]> is the profit vector for the
blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer.
4 GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Based on the formulation of the Stackelberg game in Sec-
tion 3.3, we are ready to analyze the market equilibrium
using backward induction. We first obtain the Nash Equi-
librium (NE) of the user-level noncooperative subgame Gu
by characterizing a system of interdependent demands.
We provide the sufficient conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of the NE in the user-level noncooperative
subgame Gu by solving the bounded linear complementar-
ity problem of the subgame [33]. Then, we substitute the
parametric NE of Gu into the leader-level noncooperative
subgame GL. Under a reasonable assumption, we show that
the Jacobian matrix constructed from the payoff functions
of each player in the leader-level noncooperative subgame
is negative definite. Hence, we prove that the Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) of the market game exists and is unique.
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis for User-Level Noncoopera-
tive Subgame
Intuitively, user i only buys the service when it has a
positive payoff, namely ui > 0. This indicates that there
exists a threshold θ˜i for the intrinsic value θi in (7), such
7that user i will buy the service only when θi > θ˜i. θ˜i can be
obtained by setting ui = 0:
0 = h¯+ θ˜i − pi + α
∑
j∈N
gijPr [j buys the service]
= h¯+ θ˜i − pi + α
∑
j∈N
gijPr
[
θj > θ˜j
]
= h¯+ θ˜i − pi + α
∑
j∈N
gij
[
1− FU
(
θ˜j
)]
⇔ θ˜i = pi − h¯− α
∑
j∈N
gij
[
1− FU
(
θ˜j
)]
,
(12)
where 1− FU
(
θ˜j
)
denotes the probability that user j draws
a valuation above the threshold θ˜j . For ease of exposition,
let xi = 1− FU
(
θ˜i
)
denote the probability that user i buys
the service, and xi can be further expressed as follows:
xi = 1− FU
(
θ˜i
)
= 1− FU
pi − h¯− α∑
j∈N
gij
[
1− FU
(
θ˜j
)]
= 1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj .
(13)
From (13), we can characterize a system of the users’
interdependent demands as follows:
xi =

0, if 1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj < 0,
1, if 1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj > 1,
1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj , otherwise.
(14)
After subtracting each condition in (14) by the value of its
corresponding xi, we convert (14) into the following form:
xi =
0, if 1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj − xi < 0− xi︸︷︷︸
=0
= 0,
1, if 1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj − xi > 1− xi︸︷︷︸
=1
= 0,
1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj , if 1− pi + h¯+ α
∑
j∈N
gijxj − xi = 0.
(15)
Furthermore, (15) can be rewritten into the following matrix
form:
xi =
0, if
{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x}
i
< 0,
1, if
{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x}
i
> 0,{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p + αGx}
i
, if
{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x}
i
= 0,
(16)
where I is the identity matrix, 1 = [1, 1, . . . , 1]> ∈ R|N|×1 and
{·}i represents the i-th entry of a vector. With (16), we are
ready to investigate the properties of the NE in the user-
level noncooperative subgame.
Assumption 1. αρ (G) < 1, where ρ (·) is the spectral norm of a
matrix.
The physical meaning of Assumption 1 is illustrated in
Fig. 2, where the black area is the feasible area of αρ (G).
If αρ (G) exceeds the feasible area, the social externality
will be too strong such that every user will buy the service,
which is impossible in reality.
THEOREM 1. The user-level noncooperative subgame Gu admits
a unique NE under Assumption 1.
ρ(G)
0 1 2 3 4
α
0
1
2
3
4
Figure 2: An illustration of Assumption 1.
Proof. (16) is defined as a bounded linear complementarity
problem in [33]. It is a linear instance of the general mixed
complementarity problems discussed in [35]. As discussed
in [35], the linear instance of a complementarity problem
admits a unique solution, i.e., the NE, to the user-level
noncooperative subgame Gu, if (I− αG) is a P-matrix6.
Since αρ (G) < 1 under Assumption 1, all the eigenvalues
of the matrix αG belong to (0, 1) and hence all the eigenval-
ues of the matrix (I− αG) belong to (0, 1). Therefore, (I− αG)
is a non-singular M-matrix7.
Based on Theorem 6.2.3 in [36], “any non-singular M-
matrix is a P-matrix”, (I− αG) is a P-matrix and then there
exists a unique NE in the user-level noncooperative sub-
game Gu. Thereby, the proof is completed.
According to the system of interdependent demands
(16), the set of usersN can be partitioned into three subsets,
i.e., S0, S1, and S as follows:
• S0 =
{
i
∣∣{(1 + h¯)1− p− (I− αG) x}
i
< 0, ∀i ∈ N } is the
set of users which will not buy the blockchain ser-
vice,
• S1 =
{
i
∣∣{(1 + h¯)1− p− (I− αG) x}
i
> 0, ∀i ∈ N } is the
set of users which surely will buy the blockchain
service,
• S = N\ (S0 ∪ S1) = {i|{(1 + h¯)1− p− (I− αG)x}i =
0, ∀i ∈ N} is the set of users which buy the blockchain
service with a probability over [0, 1].
Then, we obtain the following theorem:
THEOREM 2. The users in the user-level noncooperative subgame
Gu only belong to S, i.e., S = N , S0 = ∅, and S1 = ∅. Given
the service price vector p, the optimal solution to the system of
interdependent demands (16) is
x∗ = (I− αG)−1 [(1 + h¯)1− p] . (17)
Proof. We denote the optimal price by p∗ and the optimal
demand by x∗. Then, we show that S0 = ∅ and S1 = ∅.
1) S0 = ∅: We first assume that S0 6= ∅. This means
that ∃i ∈ N , such that xi∗ = 0 and {(1 + h¯)1 − p∗ −
(I−αG)x∗}i < 0. Because
{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x}
i
= 1 + h¯ + α
∑
j∈N
gijxj − xi − pi is continuous on pi
and 1 + h¯ + α
∑
j∈N
gijxj
∗ > 0, there exists a pi′ where
pi
′ < pi∗ such that 1 + h¯ + α
∑
j∈N
gijxj
∗ − pi′ > 0 and
6. A matrix A is a P-matrix if all its principal minors are positive.
7. A matrix A is a non-singular M-matrix if A = I −B for a positive
matrix B with largest eigenvalue ρ (B) < 1.
8correspondingly xi′ > 0. This indicates that when
the service price charged to user i decreases from pi∗
to pi′, user i has an incentive to increase its demand
from xi∗ = 0 to xi′ > 0. Consequently, the revenue of
the blockchain provider will increase since pi∗xi∗ = 0
while pi′xi′ > 0. Therefore, xi∗ and pi∗ cannot be the
optimal demand and price for user i, respectively.
Hence, i /∈ S0, ∀i ∈ N and S0 = ∅.
2) S1 = ∅: Similarly, we assume that S1 6= ∅.
This means that ∃l ∈ N , xl∗ = 1 and{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p∗ − (I− αG) x∗}
l
> 0. Since{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x}
l
= 1+h¯+α
∑
j∈N
gijxj−xl−pl
is continuous on pl, there exists an  where  > 0
such that 1 + h¯ + α
∑
j∈N
gijxj
∗ − (pl∗ + ) > 0 and
xl
∗ = 1. Let  = h¯ + α
∑
j∈N
gijxj
∗ − pl∗, we have
1 + h¯ + α
∑
j∈N
gijxj
∗ − (pl∗ + ) = 0, and here
xl
∗ = 1− (pl∗ + ) + h¯+
∑
j∈N
gljxj
∗ = 1. This means that
even if the service price of user l increases from pl∗
to (pl∗ + ), the demand of user l is still equal to 1
while the profit of the blockchain provider has been
increased from pl∗xl∗ = pl∗ to (pl∗ + )xl∗ = pl∗ + .
Moreover, since{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p∗ − (I− αG) x∗}
l
− 
=1 + h¯− (pl∗ + )− xl∗︸︷︷︸
1
+α
∑
j∈N
gljxj
∗ = 0, (18)
user l belongs to S instead of S1. Therefore, pl∗ and
xl
∗ are not the optimal price and demand for user l,
respectively. Hence, l /∈ S1, ∀l ∈ N and S1 = ∅.
To conclude, given any price vector p of the blockchain
service, the condition{(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x∗}
i
= 0 (19)
will be satisfied for all user i ∈ N . Therefore,(
1 + h¯
)
1− p− (I− αG) x∗ = 0, (20)
(I− αG) x∗ = (1 + h¯)1− p. (21)
Since we have already shown that the matrix (I− αG) is a
non-singular matrix in Theorem 1, the inverse of (I− αG)
exists. Multiply both sides of (21) by (I− αG)−1, then, the
optimal solution to the system of interdependent demands,
or equivalently, the NE to the user-level noncooperative
subgame Gu, is
x∗ = (I− αG)−1 [(1 + h¯)1− p] . (22)
The proof is completed.
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis for Leader-Level Noncooper-
ative Subgame
After deriving the equilibrium demand of the users, we
investigate the leader-level noncooperative subgame GL for
the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer. At the NE, no
player can increase its profit by choosing a different strategy
provided that the other player’ strategy is unchanged [37].
In what follows, we first prove that an NE exists in the
leader-level noncooperative subgame GL. Then, we prove
that this NE is unique.
Algorithm 1 Iterative best-response for searching leader
noncooperative subgame NE
Initialization: Select any feasible initial strategies as sI(0) = γ(0),
sP(0) = [p(0), h(0)]> and set t = 0.
1: while p(0), h(0), γ(0) do not satisfy the termination condition do
2: for all k = {P, I} do
3: Set the adversary joint strategies as
sk(t+ 1) = arg max
sk
Πk(sk, s−k(t)) s.t. sk ∈ Dk, (26)
where s−k represents the adversary’s strategy.
4: end for
5: Set t← t+ 1.
6: end while
Substituting the optimal demand of the users derived in
(22) into the profit function of the blockchain provider, we
can rewrite (8) into a matrix form as follows:
Πp
(
h¯,p
)
=p>(I− αG)−1 [(1 + h¯)1− p]− ah¯
1− h¯ + h¯
T
T0
NTr
− T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
dt.
(23)
The first-order partial derivative of the profit of
blockchain provider as well as that of the cyber-insurer are
shown in (24), and the second-order partial derivatives of
the blockchain provider and cyber-insurer are shown in (25).
Then, we can obtain the following theorem regarding the NE
of the leader-level noncooperative subgame.
THEOREM 3. There exists at least one NE in the leader-level
noncooperative subgame GL if and only if a > 181>(I− αG)−11.
Then, the Stackbelberg equilibrium of the market game exists.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A for the proof.
Next, we show the uniqueness of the NE in the leader-
level noncooperative subgame in Theorem 4, and hence the
Stackbelberg equilibrium is unique.
THEOREM 4. The NE in the leader-level noncooperative subgame
GL is unique if and only if a > 9(β+1)2(γu)β+1128β and hence the
Stackbelberg equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B for the proof.
4.3 Equilibrium Searching for Leader-Level Noncoop-
erative Subgame
Since in our previous discussion we have provided the
closed-form NE to the user-level noncooperative subgame
Gu in (22), we only have to focus on the derivation of the
NE in the leader-level noncooperative subgame GL. Given
(22), the search for the SE is reduced to the search of the
NE of a two-player noncooperative game. By Theorem 3,
we know that GL is a concave game with the convex and
compact strategy space (see also the proof to Theorem 3).
By Theorem 4, we know that GL admits a unique NE when
the condition given therein is satisfied. This suggests the
use of the iterative best response to solve for the NE in
GL. The iterative best-response algorithm is described in
Algorithm 1, and its convergence property is guaranteed
by Theorem 5.
9
∂Πp
∂h¯
=p>(I− αG)−11− a(
1− h¯)2 + 1γ TT0NTr,
∂ΠP
∂p
=(I− αG)−1 [(1 + h¯)1− p] ,
∂ΠI
∂γ
=− 1
γ2
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt−
(
h− 1
2
)3 [
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1
]
,
(24)

∂2ΠP
∂p2
= −(I− αG)−1,
∂2ΠP
∂p∂h¯
= (I− αG)−11,
∂2ΠP
∂p∂γ
=
(
∂2ΠI
∂γ∂p
)>
= 0,
∂2ΠP
∂h¯∂p
= 1>(I− αG)−1,
∂2ΠP
∂h¯2
= − 2a(
1− h¯)3 ,
∂2ΠP
∂h¯∂γ
= 0,

∂2ΠI
∂γ∂h¯
=− 3
(
h− 1
2
)2 [
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1
]
,
∂2ΠI
∂γ2
=
2
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
+
1
γ4
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
−
(
h− 1
2
)3 [
β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2
]
.
(25)
THEOREM 5. If the condition in Theorem 4 is satisfied, Algo-
rithm 1 converges to the unique SE from anywhere of the strategy
domains of the blockchain provider and cyber-insurer.
Proof. With the concavity of the payoff functions ΠP and ΠI
proved in Appendix A and the negative definite Jacobian
matrix J proved in Appendix B, Theorem 5 immediately
follows Theorem 10 in [38].
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct extensive numerical simulations
to evaluate the performance of the market entities at the
equilibrium in each stage. We consider a group of |N |
users in the blockchain service market. The off-diagonal
elements of social externality matrix G, i.e., gij , ∀i 6= j,
is generated following the uniform distribution over the
interval of [0, 10]. The domain of definition for α is set
as
[
5× 10−4, 8× 10−4] according to the parameter setting
in [33]. The other default coefficients are given as follows:
β = 10, pu = 1, γu = 2, T = 100, T0 = 10, NT = 100,
r = 10, q = 10 and a = 100. Note that the price that
we present in the figures of simulation results is the mean
value of the discriminatory prices. The triple integral in
the premium-related term in the profit functions of the
blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer, i.e., (8) and (9),
is calculated using the method of rectangular integral with
100 as the number of intervals. Note that our proposed
concept of cyber-insurer and blockchain service is the first
in the literature. There is no similar work with which we
can compare on a reasonably fair basis. For example, the
authors in [39] formulated a bilevel game to investigate the
interactions among the attackers, users, and cyber-insurer
in computer networks. However, since we incorporate the
specific and unique feature of the blockchain technology, i.e.,
successful attack probability in (1), reasonable comparison is
therefore not applicable.
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5.1 Numerical Results
5.1.1 Demonstration of best response and NE
Figure 3 demonstrates the NE obtained from interative best
responses with the given simulation parameters. In Fig. 3(a),
the profit of the cyber-insurer changes with the different
premium charged to the blockchain provider. According
to our previous discussion, the profit of the cyber-insurer
is controlled by the value of γ. For a given weak level
of the social externality, e.g., α = 6.5 × 10−4, there is
a corresponding strategy where the cyber-insurer’s profit
is maximized. The strategy is marked by the arrowhead
of “Best response” and constitutes the NE strategy of the
cyber-insurer under the given social externality setting. We
observe from Fig. 3(a) that as a function of the premium
coefficient γ, the profit is unimodal, and thus the optimal
solution can be obtained analytically. Similarly, there exists
10
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Figure 5: The results with increasing number of users.
the optimal point in each of Figs. 3(b), (c), and (d) for
the blockchain provider. The optimal points are marked by
the arrowhead of “Best response” and constitute the NE
strategy of the blockchain provider under different levels
of social externality. Note that all the results shown in the
figures are obtained given that the users play the NE in the
user-level game.
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium strategies for the
investment of the blockchain provider and the premium
coefficient γ for the cyber-insurer under different levels of
social externality. The NE is the point at which the best
responses for the blockchain provider and cyber-insurer in-
tersect. Again, this is given that the users play the NE in the
user-level game. Under different levels of social externality,
different NE are observed. As the level of social externality
grows higher, i.e., a decision of one user has stronger effect
to the decisions of other users, the other users are more
likely to buy the same service if one user buys the service.
As expected, when the level of social externality grows
higher, the users are more likely to also buy the service, the
blockchain provider has more money and more incentives
to invest in the infrastructure and accordingly the premium
coefficient γ decreases (see Fig. 4). The reason for this result
is explained in the subsequent discussions.
5.1.2 The impact of the number of users
We first evaluate the impacts by the number of users on the
payoff of the market entities in Fig. 5, where the number
of users increases from 50 to 120. Then, we evaluate the
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Figure 6: The results with increasing social externality.
performance under three levels of social externality, e.g.,
6.5 × 10−4, 7 × 10−4, and 7.5 × 10−4 which represent
weak, medium, and strong levels of social externality, re-
spectively. As expected, the profit of the blockchain provider
increases significantly when the social externality becomes
stronger. As the number of users increases, the profit of the
blockchain provider also increases under the given social
externality settings. Moreover, the increase of the profit of
the blockchain provider becomes larger when the social ex-
ternality is stronger. Intuitively, the reason is that the social
externality stimulates the demand of each user. In return,
the blockchain provider can raise the price of service ac-
cordingly and hence improves its profit. Meanwhile, as the
social externality becomes stronger, the blockchain provider
also achieves greater profit. This indicates that the attack
may incur more loss to the blockchain provider. Therefore,
the blockchain provider has a higher incentive to invest in
the infrastructure to prevent double-spending attack. This
explains the result that the investment by the blockchain
provider increases at a higher rate with α = 7.5×10−4 than
with α = 6.5 × 10−4. As a result, the stronger social exter-
nality reduces the successful attack probability at a higher
rate. Correspondingly, as shown in Fig. 5(f), the premium
coefficient γ decreases at a higher rate with the stronger
social externality. This result indicates that the premium also
decreases at a higher rate with stronger social externality.
Thus, the cyber-insurer’s profit decreases at a higher rate
when the social externality becomes stronger as shown in
Fig. 5(b).
5.1.3 The impact of social externality
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of social externality on
the payoffs of the three market entities with 100 users.
As expected, the users’ total service demand increases
as the social externality becomes stronger (see Fig. 6(d)).
From Figs. 6(a) and (b), we observe that the profit of the
blockchain provider increases while the profit of the cyber-
insurer decreases. The reason is that the users with stronger
social externality are more sensitive to the security level of
the blockchain service, and the security level depends on the
investment ratio of the blockchain provider. Therefore, the
blockchain provider will raise its investment as the social
externality increases, which decreases the probability of
successful double-spending attacks. Accordingly, the cyber-
insurer reduces its premium as shown in Fig. 6(f), and
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Figure 7: The result with increasing attacker’s computing
resource.
this will lead to the decrease of the cyber-insurer’s profit.
Moreover, since the investment by the blockchain provider
increases, the security level of the blockchain service is im-
proved, and thus the service demand of users increases. This
situation results in the increase of the blockchain provider’s
profit.
Additionally, recall that the investment ratio of the
blockchain provider depends on not only the investment
from the blockchain provider, but also the computing re-
source owned by the attackers. For this reason, in our
performance evaluation, we also vary the attacker’s invest-
ment in computing resource by considering three cases with
a = 50, a = 100 and a = 150, respectively. From Fig. 6(f),
we observe that the decreasing rate of the curves becomes
higher as the attacker’s investment increases, which means
that decreasing rate of the premium becomes higher as
the attacker’s investment increases. The reason is that the
increasing rate of the investment by the blockchain provider
becomes faster as the attacker’s investment increases, and
this also results in a higher decreasing rate of the successful
attack probability. Consequently, the decreasing rate of the
probability of paying claim is the highest with a = 150
which is the largest attacker’s investment.
5.1.4 The impact of attacker’s computing resource
Finally, we evaluate in Fig. 7 the impact of the attackers’
computing resource on the performance of the users, the
blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer. We consider
three different situations with different sizes of a block,
i.e., the number of transactions included in that block, with
NT = 100, NT = 200 and NT = 300. We observe from
Figs. 7(a) and (b) that as the attacker’s computing resource
increases, the profit of the blockchain provider decreases
and the profit of the cyber-insurer remains unchanged. The
reason is that the blockchain provider needs to increase its
infrastructure investment when the attacker’s computing
resource increases (see Fig. 7(e)). Otherwise, the successful
attack probability will significantly increase, and it results
in the increase in the cost of the blockchain provider.
With an increasing computing resource controlled by the
attackers, the investment ratio of the blockchain provider
cannot remain as high as before. This result is illustrated
in Fig. 7(e) with h
∗
a+h∗
∣∣∣
a=50
≈ 1819 > h
∗
a+h∗
∣∣∣
a=100
≈ 1213
when NT = 300. Therefore, as the attackers’ computing
resource increases, the successful attack probability and
consequently the probability of the cyber-insurer paying
the claim increases accordingly. Then, as shown in Fig. 7(f),
the cyber-insurer increases the premium to keep its profit
unchanged. Ultimately, the cost of the blockchain provider
also increases. Moreover, as the attackers’ computing re-
source increases, even when the blockchain provider re-
duces the price of its service to attract more users, the total
demand from the users still decreases (see Figs. 7(c) and (d)).
Consequently, this reduces the revenue and profit of the
blockchain provider.
Furthermore, we show that the impact of the attackers’
computing resource on the other parties in the market is
subject to the number of transactions in one block NT. With
the fixed transaction fee and compensation rate, the more
transactions in a single block is, the more reward that the
blockchain provider obtains from mining a block. Moreover,
since the compensation price of one block increases as the
number of transactions in one block increases, the more
compensation it will pay to the users once the attacks
happen. Then, the blockchain provider has more incentive
to invest in the computing resource. This is consistent with
Fig. 7(e), where the increasing rate of the investment by
the blockchain provider is higher with NT = 300 than
that with NT = 100. On the other hand, as the attacker’s
computing resource increases, the increasing rate of the
successful attack probability is lower with NT = 300 than
that with NT = 100. Consequently, the increasing rate of the
premium is lower with NT = 300 than that with NT = 100
(see Fig. 7(f)). Moreover, as NT increases, the increasing rate
of the successful attack probability will decrease, and the
users’ demand will be less affected. This is consistent with
Figs. 7(c) and (d), where the decreasing rates of both the total
user demand and the service price shrink as NT increases.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a risk management frame-
work of the blockchain service market by introducing the
cyber-insurance as a mean for protecting financially the
blockchain provider from double-spending attacks. We have
modeled the interaction among the blockchain provider, the
cyber-insurer and the users in the market as a two-stage
Stackelberg game. For the blockchain provider, we have
considered the problem of balancing between the proactive
protection strategy, i.e., investing in computing power, and
the reactive protection strategy, i.e., purchasing the cyber-
insurance. For the users, we have considered the impact
of both the social externality and the service security on
the users’ valuation of the blockchain service. In particu-
lar, for the cyber-insurer, we have incorporated the risk-
adjusted pricing mechanism for premium adaptation. We
have studied the equilibrium strategies of the three parties
in the market using backward induction. We have analyti-
cally examined the conditions for the Stackelberg game to
exist and to be unique. Furthermore, we have conducted
extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of the
market entities at the equilibrium. For the future work,
we will investigate the long-run competition between the
blockchain provider and cyber-insurer.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. Substituting the second partial derivatives of ΠP
in (25), the Hessian matrix of the blockchain provider’s
payoff is
HP =

∂2ΠP
∂p2
∂2ΠP
∂p∂h¯
∂2ΠP
∂h¯∂p
∂2ΠP
∂h¯2
 =
 −(I− αG)
−1 (I− αG)−11
1>(I− αG)−1 − 2a(
1− h¯)3
 .
(27)
We can partition the Hessian matrix in (27) into two
matrices as follows:
HP =
 −(I− αG)
−1 (I− αG)−11
1>(I− αG)−1 − a(
1− h¯)3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
HP1
+
[
O 0
0> − a
(1−h¯)3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
HP2
= HP1 + HP2 ,
(28)
where HP2 is obviously a negative semidefinite matrix.
Let QP =
[
I 1
0> 1
]
. The congruent matrix of HP1 is:
QP
>HP1QP =
[ −(I− αG)−1 0
0> − a
(1−h¯)3
+ 1>(I− αG)−11
]
.
(29)
Therefore, the negative definiteness of HP1 depends on
the negative definiteness of (29). According to the proof of
Theorem 1, all the eigenvalues of (I− αG)−1 belong to (0, 1).
This means that −(I− αG)−1 in (29) is a negative definite
matrix. We know that the domain of h¯ is
[
1
2
, 1
)
, and the
inequality equation in (30) will be satisfied.
− a(
1− h¯)3 + 1>(I− αG)−11 < − a(1− 1
2
)3 + 1>(I− αG)−11
=− 8a+ 1>(I− αG)−11.
(30)
−8a + 1>(I− αG)−11 < 0 is satisfied according to Theo-
rem 3 and hence the second block in (29), i.e., − a
(1−h¯)3
+
1>(I− αG)−11, is also negative. With the two negative def-
inite blocks on the diagonal positions and zero blocks on
the off-diagonal positions, the matrix in (29) is a negative
definite matrix. Therefore, HP1 is a negative definite matrix.
Then, as the sum of one negative definite matrix and one
negative semidefinite matrix, i.e., HP1 and HP2 , respectively,
the Hessian matrix HP in (27) is a negative definite matrix.
Therefore, ΠP is a strictly concave function of
[
p>, h¯
]>.
In what follows, we prove that ΠI is also a concave
function of its own decision variable γ. Recall the second
partial derivative of ΠI on γ in (25) as follows:
∂2ΠI
∂γ2
=
2
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
+
1
γ4
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
−
(
h− 1
2
)3 [
β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2
]
=
1
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dt
+
1
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
×
{
1 +
1
γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]}
dt
−
(
h− 1
2
)3
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[(β + 1) γ − (β − 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
βγβ−2.
(31)
To ensure the concavity of ΠI with respect to γ, we need the
following inequality to be satisfied:{
1 +
1
γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]}
≥ 0. (32)
From (32), we have{
1 +
1
γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]}
≥ 0
⇔ 1
γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
≥ −1
⇔ 1
γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
≥ 1
γ
ln
[∫ 1
0
P (θ) dθ −
∫ 1
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
≥ −1
⇒ 1
γ
ln
[∫ 1/2
0
P (θ) dθ
]
≥ −1⇔ 1
γ
ln
1
2
≥ −1⇔ γ ≥ ln 2
(33)
From (33) we learn that the sufficient condition to ensure the
inequality in (32) is γ ≥ ln 2. Such a condition holds on (1, γu].
Therefore, ΠI is a concave function on γ. Then, the profit
functions of the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer,
i.e., ΠP and ΠI, are concave with respect to their own de-
cision variables, i.e.,
[
p>, h¯
]> and γ, respectively. According
to [40], the NE in the leader-level game GL exists hence the
Stackbelberg equilibrium exists. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. According to Theorem 3.1 (Rosen’s Theorem) in [41],
the uniqueness of the NE in GL holds if the Jacobian matrix
constructed from the profit functions of the two players, i.e.,
J given in (34), is negative definite. After substituting the
relevant second partial derivatives given in (25) into (34),
we are able to rewrite (34) as in (35).
Then, we partition the Jacobian matrix (34) into two
matrices as shown in (36). In J1 given by (36), we have[ −2(I− αG)−1 2(I− αG)−11
21>(I− αG)−1 − 2a
(1−h¯)3
]
= 2HP1 , where HP1 is the
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
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+

O 0 0
0> − 2a
(1−h¯)3
− 3
(
h− 1
2
)2
×
[
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1
]
0>
− 3
(
h− 1
2
)2
×
[
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1
] −2(h− 12)3 [β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
.
(36)
R1J2R1
> =

O 0 0
0>
− 2a(
1− h¯)3
+
9
(
h− 1
2
)4[
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1]2
2
(
h− 1
2
)3 [
β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2]
0
0> 0 −2
(
h− 1
2
)3
[(β + 1) γ − (β − 1)]βγβ−2

. (37)
matrix in (28). As shown in the proof to Theorem 3, HP1
is a negative definite matrix, and thus the first block in the
matrix J1 of (36), i.e.,
[ −2(I− αG)−1 2(I− αG)−11
21>(I− αG)−1 − 2a
(1−h¯)3
]
, is a
negative definite matrix. For the second non-zero block in
J1, the condition to ensure negative definiteness is
0 >
4
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
+
2
γ4
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
=
2
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]
dt
+
2
γ3
T
T0
NTq
∫ 1
1/2
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]1/γ
× ln
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]{
1 +
1
γ
[
1−
∫ t
1/2
P (θ) dθ
]}
dt.
(38)
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Following the same procedure in the proof to Theorem 3,
from (38) we obtain the condition of negative definiteness
as γ ≥ ln 2. Therefore, with the two negative definite blocks
on the diagonal positions and all-zero blocks on the off-
diagonal positions, J1 in (36) is a negative definite matrix.
After defining
R1 =
I 0 0
0> 1
− 3
(
h− 1
2
)2 [
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1
]
×
{
−2
(
h− 1
2
)3}−1
×
[
β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2
]−1
0> 0 1

,
(39)
we can obtain the congruent matrix of J2 in (36)
as shown in (37). In (37), we observe that
−2
(
h− 1
2
)3
[(β + 1) γ − (β − 1)]βγβ−2 < 0. Then, to ensure
the negative semidefiniteness of J2, we need the following
inequality to hold:
− 2a(
1− h¯)3 +
9
(
h− 1
2
)4[
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1]2
2
(
h− 1
2
)3 [
β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2] ≤ 0.
(40)
Then, we can determine the upper bound for (40) as follows:
− 2a(
1− h¯)3 + 9
(
h¯− 1
2
)4[
(β + 1) γβ − βγβ−1]2
2
(
h¯− 1
2
)3 [
β (β + 1) γβ−1 − β (β − 1) γβ−2]
=− 2a(
1− h¯)3 + 9
(
h¯− 1
2
)
[(β + 1) γ − β]2γβ
2 [β (β + 1) γ − β (β − 1)]
<− 2a(
1− h¯)3 + 9
(
h¯− 1
2
)
(β + 1)2γβ+2
2 [β (β + 1) γ − β (β − 1)]
<− 2a(
1− h¯)3 + 9
(
h¯− 1
2
)
(β + 1)2γβ+2
2 [β (β + 1) γ − β (β − 1) γ]
=− 2a(
1− h¯)3 + 9
(
h¯− 1
2
)
(β + 1)2γβ+2
2βγ (β + 1− β + 1)
=− 2a(
1− h¯)3 + 9
(
h¯− 1
2
)
(β + 1)2γβ+1
4β
(41)
Since h¯ ∈ [ 1
2
, 1
)
, the last equation in (41),
i.e., − 2a
(1−h¯)3
+
9(h¯− 12 )(β+1)2γβ+1
4β
, is smaller than
− 2a
(1− 12 )
3 +
9(1− 12 )(β+1)2γβ+1
4β
= −16a + 9(β+1)2(γu)β+1
8β
.
−16a+ 9(β+1)2(γu)β+1
8β
< 0 is satisfied according to Theorem 4
and hence the matrix in (37) has zero and negative definite
blocks on its diagonal positions and zero blocks on the
off-diagonal positions. This means that the matrix (37) is a
negative semi-definite matrix. Since J2 is congruent with
the matrix (37), J2 is also a negative semidefinite matrix.
To summarize, as the sum of a negative definite matrix J1
and a negative semidefinite matrix J2, the Jacobian matrix
in (34), i.e., J, is a negative definite matrix. Thus, the NE
in the leader-level noncooperative subgame GL is unique
and the Stackbelberg equilibrium is unique. The proof is
completed.
